The Intellectual and Historical Origins of Liberalism

*By Jonathan Arriola

When writing a history of liberalism, we are basically faced with two intimately related problems: 1) that of determining when it begins and 2) that of identifying which are the specific episodes and/or ideological currents that took part in its gestation.

With respect to the first, and although we are not unaware that conceptual elements from Classical Antiquity participated in its constitution -in particular, the transcendental stoic idea that Man is subject to a "Natural Law"- as well as from medieval Christianity, if we had to set a specific date, we would say that liberalism finds its first philosophical germs in the 17th century, by the hand of authors such as Locke, Bayle, Spinoza and, to a lesser extent, Bodino, Grotius and Hobbes. Despite the above, it cannot and should not be omitted that already by the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century a series of fundamental changes occurred in Europe that provided the conditions, both material and philosophical, for the emergence of liberal thought.

As for the second, we can say, very tightly, that the sources of liberalism are found in such diverse events as the ruin of the feudal economy and the subsequent hatching of the capitalist economy, the numerous geographical discoveries, the schism of the Church, the debacle of Rome as the political centre of Europe, the wars of religion, the gradual rebirth of science and the countless technological advances that a more exact and profitable knowledge of the world brought with it. Although from different historical matrices, these events brought, each in its own way and in its own particular sphere, the essential ingredients that would result in a new way of approaching social, economic and political relations. Individualism, rationalism, universalism together with a growing demand for greater equality and economic and political freedom, all products of a Europe in clear transformation, will constitute the obligatory and foundational premises of liberal discourse.

1. In search of economic freedom

A. The emergence of the capitalist economy

By the end of the 15th century, the European economy was expanding into dimensions hitherto unknown. For the first time in history, the stock exchanges see the light in different points of the Old Continent: Antwerp, London, Lyon, etc. Along the same lines, banks were rapidly spreading throughout Europe, testifying to an extraordinary economic accumulation. The feudal economy was exhausted and proceeded to give way to a new type of economy based mainly on maritime trade which, as a result of improvements in navigation methods, was intensified on an unparalleled scale. Those cities lying on the Baltic and the Mediterranean, such as Florence, Genoa, Venice, Lübeck, Antwerp, etc., which were the direct promoters and beneficiaries of the growth of trade, are consecrated as the neuralgic points of a Europe that is progressively moving towards leaving behind the long centuries of the Middle Ages.

The above table describes nothing less than the birth of commercial capitalism. At the same time, however, it also alludes to the genesis of liberalism. We say this because this process of economic accumulation in the 16th century will create in the new "businessman", in the Venetian, Genoese and Florentine merchants, a taste for economic freedom, essential for expanding horizons beyond, which will increase as this accumulation increases and which he will hardly give up without fighting. That solidarity established between freedom and capitalism, right from the beginning, will be the first seed of liberalism. However, it is still just that: a seed. And it is that, for that century, liberalism only appears in a very tenuous form, almost unrecognizable for those of us who, ex post, know that it will become an autonomous and coherent doctrine, with political, economic, social and even religious resonances. At this stage, liberalism, if one can speak of such a thing for the period, manifests itself in a set of ideas, which are not yet perceived as capable of generating a broader system of thought, but which, nevertheless, are oriented in the same direction of gaining more and more space for the new capitalist enterprise.

But there is still something to be done if we are to understand the profound origins of liberalism: namely, what is at the root of that capitalist blossoming? A valid answer would answer that it was the discovery of America, the creation of the Hanseatic League, the new technical possibilities and the new modes of production that appeared by the end of the 14th century that determined that particular boom of the economy, at that precise moment.

While it would be absurd to deny the impact of these profound transformations, it would be equally foolish to ignore that these changes, which expanded man's material opportunities, are ultimately rooted in a cultural revolution. Indeed, in the era of "capitalism", a new attitude is emerging towards the world which, sometimes against the old spirit and sometimes in silent complicity with it, will conceive of society, Man, existence and God in a different way. This change in mentalities for the 15th century is what has been called the Renaissance.

The economic eruption at the end of the 15th century, the "capitalist push" of the time, is a faithful reflection of that impetuous spiritual upheaval that the Renaissance brought about. What happens is that the Renaissance prohijó a philosophy that would promote a new relationship with the World, based on a revaluation of earthly life. This new philosophy would have as one of its most visible consequences an appreciation for material wealth; one of the most important implicit, if any, of capitalism. Let us delve deeper into this idea.

B. The revaluation of earthly life

The Middle Ages had preached in four voices the "contemptus mundis"; a concept according to which earthly life should be despised. For the medieval worldview, human existence on earth was merely a preparation for eternal life. As a consequence, the surrounding world was conceived as perishable, as a temporary residence to which no major regard was owed. The only thing that should matter during the ephemeral earthly transit was to try to walk on the right path and avoid sin, for only in this way would the passage to Heaven be assured.

For the paradigm of the time, whoever wanted to dedicate himself "to the things of this world" was mortgaging the most important treasure that was possible to reach the hand of God: eternal salvation. And he was, for that very reason, worthy of being judged and punished. In the same way, to call the forces to the understanding of Nature, to unravel its most intimate mysteries, whether for pleasure or for utility, was for the medieval conception to outline an excessive confidence in the power of human intelligence. For the imaginary of the period, it was God who held the key to the secrets of Nature and existence in general. And these will not be revealed until we reach their presence. Therefore, the Church, monopoly interpreter of Scripture and jealous gendarme of salvation, saw any attempt to make Nature intelligible as a sin of pride against God's omnipotence.

In all spheres, man was essentially thought to be incapable of attaining autonomy given his complete subordination to the Divinity. Medieval institutions reflected this theological view of life, which placed a heavy emphasis on the ends of the afterlife. It was believed that human society was not an artifact deliberately created to serve the individual, but a natural order established from Heaven to assure the individual, even through the use of force, his passage to the eternal presence of God. As the representative of the Divinity on earth, the Church was recognized as the only authorized source to dictate the good morals that would govern all the "Res publica christiana". The hierarchy was simple: at the apex is God, from God emanates the just morality and from it basically all other human activities depend. As the owner and administrator of morality, the Church then assured itself sovereignty over all other orders of human activity.

As part of morality, economic activity did not escape the severe scrutiny of the Church, which condemned every "excessively" earthly enterprise as suspected of sin. Hence, the world of medieval Christianity is the world that punishes trade with pagans, condemns the charging of interest, and condemns as vain and contrary to Scripture all accumulation beyond what is just and necessary. As one might imagine, no economic transformation of magnitude could prosper in such adverse conditions. And so it was.

The Renaissance came to question this status quo. He lunged head-on against that discourse that cluttered the earthly actions of men. In its interior, the Renaissance thinks that the Middle Ages had overoccupied the beyond. The Renaissance, for its part, sought to balance the equation and underline that the world of the hereafter also deserved attention. We must worry about our eternal life, but this concern cannot reach the extreme point of forcing us to sacrifice our short life on Earth: this burden is too onerous. The Renaissance thus rose up against the ascetic life that had prevailed until then, declaring open war on the ancient "contemptus mundis".

The reappearance and reinterpretation of philosophical and literary works from Classical Antiquity gave new oxygen to Western civilization. Since much of Catholic doctrine was based largely on the philosophy of Greek and Roman authors, such as the Stoics, the reference to the ancients was the perfect safeguard to recover, without the censorship of the Church, the human-rationalist heritage that had been thought lost with the advent of Christianity and theocentrism. With this mission, the Renaissance spirit quickly makes its way, seeking to renew all that seems to be overcome by the excessive weight of ultra-terrestrial life.

Above all, the Renaissance gave men a curious spirit. The Renaissance man is not only concerned with letters. He is also, and mainly, interested in Nature and its mysteries. Thus, for a time, he takes his gaze away from Heaven and directs it to contemplate the most immediate wonders offered everywhere by an exuberant Nature. Enchanted by this unspeakable beauty, the Renaissance man gives a new beginning to art, whose meaning will be to portray natural magnificence. Along the same path of curiosity, not only is art resumed, but the rusty gears of science are also being oiled. A voracious desire is awakened in man to make rationally intelligible the beauty of the natural world that art only tries to imitate.

By turning to the exploration of the outside world, material wealth began to be appreciated as never before in the centuries of the Middle Ages. In particular, the Renaissance made the rediscovery of Nature a perfect opportunity to make life in this world more comfortable.

In its quest to make the outside world habitable, it directs its forces towards the disarmament of all moral sanctions that stubbornly weighed on the greed for profit. The new philosophy conceived that the fruits of the earth were there only to be enjoyed. It preaches that the body should not be deprived of all pleasure while awaiting eternity. On the contrary, she is convinced that God has surrounded us with natural wonders to exalt the senses, to make this ephemeral existence a more affable and bearable instance. For all these reasons, he judges that the search for wealth is perfectly licit. Deep down, and paving the way for the French physiocrats, he conceives that that natural impulse that cries out for the conquest of material well-being must be allowed to operate freely. In this way, he aims to renew the old institutions.

It was then that a struggle between two sides took shape. On the one hand, a tenacious will to gestate wealth. On the other hand, a morality that censored any act that was not exclusively aimed at safeguarding eternal life. The battle was long and arduous but, by the end of the 16th century, the new mentality had already scored a success. The moral-theological one yielded in certain rigorities, allowing to take advantage, although with many limitations, of the possibilities of material exploitation that the new world propitiated. In this way, the path to the attainment of material wealth had been smoothed. Of course, this did not happen simultaneously in every corner of Europe. In reality, each region had its own tempo. However, where the Renaissance was deepest, prosperity germinated brutally. Cities such as Genoa, Florence, Venice, Antwerp, etc., which would experience, for the period, an unprecedented economic accumulation, are precisely aware of this.

C. Towards the secularization of morality

As a product of the above, Christian morality was transfigured in an incredible way, being forced to adapt to the ends that a growing concern for "worldliness" imposed overwhelmingly. From there appears, very timidly at the beginning, an ethic linked to work, to the generation of wealth. This remodeling of customs and morals was so radical that the Church had no choice but to compromise with the new spirit of the time.

Some time later, a philosophy will slowly but deeply penetrate the consciousness, which will argue that the shortcut to social welfare is to grant the individual the greatest possible freedom. A philosophy that will have its peak in the work of Adam Smith, several centuries after the beginning of the process. It is then that morality, previously conceived as a function of ultra-terrestrial life, will come to serve the worldly purposes of usefulness or maximization of the common good, as will be explicitly proposed by the physiocrats and Helvétius or d'Holbach in 18th century France and Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham in 19th century England.

It is clear, then, that this development took a long time to fully unfold. But beyond that, the important thing to emphasize is that the cultural convulsion that Europe lived during the centuries that compose the Renaissance, will throw a fundamental consequence for liberalism. The struggle between the new perspectives of Renaissance man and the axioms of an essentially theological morality ended up playing in favour of the separation of the two spheres. That is to say, during this whole process, morality will manage to free itself from theology, thus emancipating itself from the iron transcendental demands to which it was enslaved.

Without this division of terrains, liberalism would not have been able to articulate itself correctly. It is well known that this supposes an absolute independence, not only from theology, but from any other dogmatism. In particular, the idea of tolerance, which is the very core of liberal logic, can only be founded on the basis of a secular morality that embraces, without compromising, all cultural expressions and religious doctrines.

2. Managing political secularization

A. The Protestant Reformation

The process of secularization of morality, favoured by a revaluation of earthly life, overlapped with the emergence of other transformations which were also legitimate daughters of the Renaissance and which, in the same way, would help to give birth to liberalism. In particular, we will refer to the Protestant Reformation of the 15th century.

The active participation of the Protestant Reformation in the shaping of liberalism is beyond any doubt. It is not abusive to say that perhaps it has been one of the political-religious vicissitudes with the greatest impact on the path of liberalism and, more broadly, of Modernity. This is indeed so to the extent that we observe that its numerous ramifications signified a general revolt against principles that had been conceived until then as "sacred" and "unquestionable". After the Reformation, the old pre-modern world, organized around a relatively consolidated Christian unity, a stamental society and a preeminently religious view of the world, began to crumble noisily, paving the way for new ways of conceiving "intra" and "inter" political relations.

If it were necessary to define the exact moment of the beginning of this debacle with major consequences, we would say that it began in 1523, when Martin Luther published the controversial work "From secular authority to what extent is obedience owed to it". In saying this, it is by no means intended to ignore or minimize the wealthy antecedents that, during previous centuries, fueled the revolution of the Reformed. But it was certainly Luther's work that, by its pretensions, managed to channel all the discontents that had been gestated against the alleged despotism of the Church. Hence, the bourgeoisie, the German nationalists, the Saxon court, various artists and, at least initially, the humanists inherited from the Renaissance, quickly bowed to him.

Hence Luther is more than a religious leader and also becomes a political figure highly relevant to the future of the West. In his assault on the Catholic Church, Luther stimulated, albeit clearly outside the initial calculations, a profound rethinking of the political organization as it had been driven by the papacy since the fall of Rome. Something that begins precisely by reformulating the old "theory of the two swords".

According to Catholic tradition, the Church had two swords. These were, on the one hand, the sword that governs temporal affairs and, on the other, that which governs religious affairs. Through this metaphor, it was intended to establish that the Church had competence over both the temporal and the spiritual order. Although these were one in his hands, the Church made use of the Princes to whom he expressly entrusted the function of managing temporal affairs. That transfer, however, was not definitive but of a transitory nature, to be exercised in the name of the power of God granted to the Holy See. Therefore, according to this model, the power of the Prince was unfailingly subsumed to the power of the Church.

However, that which had been a fundamental theoretical weapon of the Church in its accreditation over the centuries as a political power established by God Himself now turned against it by the hand of Lutheran re-elaboration. Indeed, what for the Church were simply two sides of the same coin, for the German reformer were two completely "different" and "unmistakable" planes. Specifically, Luther would deny the existence of two orders and, in contrast, ensure the establishment of "two kingdoms. One is intended specifically for believers in Christ and the other is intended for believers in Christ.

Specifically, Luther will deny the existence of two orders and, in contrast, ensure the establishment of "two kingdoms. One is intended specifically for believers in Christ and the other for those who do not share that faith. The first is governed by the religious sword and the second by the secular sword. Thus Luther, recognizing the existence of non-Christian peoples beyond the borders of the great Christian Republic, proposes a solution for them: secular government.

But why the need for secular government? The question is simple: if all men were Christians, there would be no need for princes or kings since Christians, bearers of true morals, would be able to live in perfect harmony with one another. But since this is not so, "[...] God has established for those other governments than the Christian order and the kingdom of God and has put them to the sword so that, even if they wanted to, they would not be able to carry out their evil deeds. Since it was God who installed secular authority on earth, Christians as well as non-Christians were to submit to it, without any right to resistance.

With this doctrine, Luther takes a decisive step in the direction of achieving political secularization. In fact, his doctrine aimed at taking away the Pope's secular sword and handing it definitively to a political authority that was no longer, at least formally, subject to the power of the Christian Religion symbolized by Rome. Thus, there was no longer a single centre of power, which was given the power to decide on all questions, but rather a plurality of powers that reserve the right to manage the affairs of this world. With all of this, the spaces are once again split. It is only politics that now has to gain independence from religion. Luther broke the bond of subjection that united politics with institutionalized religion. By removing the Pope from the political hierarchy, he gave free rein for political authority to lead the community toward secular ends. The Pope no longer had the competence to judge the conduct of states: political power and religious power had been irreversibly dissociated.

B. Rethinking political legitimacy

With the schism of the Church, sixteenth-century Europe was roughly divided between Protestants and Catholics, and with this division, new problems arose for the political theory of the time.

In fact, the division of the waters made the legitimacy of the monarchies stagger strongly to the extent that they had appealed for the existence of a "divine law" of which the Church was the sole messenger and guardian. In other words, in a context where half of Europe openly disputed the Pope's authority, it became unacceptable to form a monarchy on the basis of a divine power of which Rome was the sole spokesman. It was only a matter of time, then, before the reformed critique of the Church extended also to the monarchy, which had built the building of its power with the bricks of Roman Catholic doctrine. There appears, in other words, the problem of the sources of legitimate "sovereignty". Therefore, it became imperative to look for another, less shaky, legitimate ground.

It is necessary to point out that the theoretical questioning of the foundations of the monarchy was fed by a growth of its intervening power, something that was criticized by the powerful sectors of the population. By the 16th century, a process of consolidation of monarchies with a strong absolutist vocation had begun in various parts of Europe.

Luther himself helped by placing the monopoly of political power, of the "secular sword", in the hands of a single sovereign as a solution to the vacuum of political power left by the withdrawal of the Church. Although it differs in content and general philosophy, Luther's work, in that sense, woven an alliance with the realism of Machiavelli, who, in the same way, although from Italy and for Italy, would proclaim the need for a monarchy with a centralized and supreme power. By denying the secular sword to the Church, the Lutheran thesis recognized, at least theoretically, the freedom of the King and Prince from the ecclesiastical "yoke", from the political patronage of the Church. Thus, the Lutheran proposal favored the absolutist tendency, recognizing the power and monopoly authority of the Prince or King, that is, the "sovereign". For the German theologian, God uses the State to exercise his sovereignty over the human world (Raynaud; Rials 2002, 31).

That which Luther still raises in religious terms, because although secular power is exempt from that of the Church it is still in relation of dependence with that of God, Hobbes will translate it, in full syntony with that of the Church.

That which Luther still puts forward in religious terms, inasmuch as although secular power is exempt from that of the Church it is still in a relationship of dependence on that of God, Hobbes will translate it, in full harmony with the rationalist boom of the seventeenth century, into completely secular terms. Like Luther, Hobbes will be a supporter of an absolute monarchy only that instead of deriving it from God he will do so, taking up again the Roman and Germanic tradition, through a hypothetical "social contract" drawn between individuals. Both the idea of society as a "set of individuals", that of "natural rights" and that of "contract", used by Hobbes to build his theory of sovereignty, will be fundamental components of the theoretical substance of liberalism. However, for this to happen effectively by the second half of the 17th century, the theoretical orphanhood of the monarchy had to be resolved first. In order to do this, three currents entered into a dispute that would have a strong influence on the development of liberalism.

1. In the first place, the so-called "monarchomaniacs" appeared on the scene. Luther had preached submission to the Prince as a way of avoiding social chaos, especially as he had witnessed with the peasant revolt of 1524 in Germany. But that axiom soon proved unworkable. Once the Counter-Reformation was set in motion, the Protestants were persecuted by their princes, especially in Scotland and France, and thus concluded that they had a God-given right to resist such abuses. This root has precisely the monastic theory, which will strongly oppose the absolutist justifications of the monarchy, advocated, as we shall see, by Catholic reactionaries.

According to the monarchs, the monarch must exercise his power "in accordance with the law". This means that the power of a Prince must be based on society, which establishes certain limits for him. Moving ahead of Locke, the monarchists recognized the right of the people to rise up against the Prince if it were the case that he did not respect certain fundamental mandates, such as the divine, or constitutive of the community he governs. It is true that the right to revolt already appeared in some Greek and medieval theoretical developments, especially in scholastic authors who supported the King's indirect sovereignty, with monastic theory, and later with liberal theory, that right to resistance became radicalized, becoming a "fundamental" and "inalienable" right of the community.

One of the most emblematic texts of the monastic claim was the "Vindicae contra Tyrannos", published under the pseudonym of Stephen Junius Brutus in 1579. It explicitly approves the right to resistance if the King deviates from the divine Law or acts contrary to the foundations of the community. Perhaps the last monarchomaniac was the Calvinist philosopher Johnannes Althusius who, having moved in the humanist and pre-illustrated circles of the Herborn school, carries out, in his "Politics" of 1603, one of the most acute defenses of popular sovereignty.

2. In the second place, the defenders of the monarchy of divine Right were heard who reacted against what they called the "excesses" of the Protestant monarchs. This theory postulated that if the power of the King does not derive from the Pope, then it does so directly from that of God. To justify this assertion, they took as a basis the epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, which states: "Let every individual be subject to the responsible authorities, since there is no authority that does not come from God, and the continuities have been by God" (Romans 12:21). As can be seen from the last sentence of the text, another of the fundamental pillars of this doctrine was the premise that the hereditary right is irrevocable or, in other words, that the rights of the monarch to govern, which are granted to him from birth, are inalienable, that is, they cannot be usurped or deposed under any title. To support this thesis, it was argued that God had chosen from the beginning those who would govern and that this choice was transmitted through the bonds of blood.

Inasmuch as the monarch was conceived as the direct representative of God on earth, a role once occupied by the Pope, his power was visualized as unlimited. Like God, the King must obey only himself: in other words, his power is absolute because he is free from all earthly control. It is thus argued that it is the King, and not the Pope or the Emperor, who has the "plenitudo potestatis", repelling any limitation of a legal nature. On the other hand, and if the monarchists enabled the people to rise up against their rulers in certain situations, the supporters of the monarchy of divine origin will argue, in contrast, that passive obedience is a mandate.

That which Luther still puts forward in religious terms, inasmuch as although secular power is exempt from that of the Church it is still in a relationship of dependence on that of God, Hobbes will translate it, in full harmony with the rationalist boom of the seventeenth century, into completely secular terms. Like Luther, Hobbes will be a supporter of an absolute monarchy only that instead of deriving it from God he will do so, taking up again the Roman and Germanic tradition, through a hypothetical "social contract" drawn between individuals. Both the idea of society as a "set of individuals", that of "natural rights" and that of "contract", used by Hobbes to build his theory of sovereignty, will be fundamental components of the theoretical substance of liberalism. However, for this to happen effectively by the second half of the 17th century, the theoretical orphanhood of the monarchy had to be resolved first. In order to do this, three currents entered into a dispute that would have a strong influence on the development of liberalism.

3. Thirdly, there are the moderates, whose doctrine was equidistant both from the monarchy of divine origin and from monastic theory. This position would provide the firm ground for the restructuring of the old iusnaturalism of stoic prosapia which, at the same time as with certain elements taken from the monarchists, would serve to pave the way for liberal doctrine.

Perhaps it was Juan Bodino who best represented this current of thought. In his great work, "The Six Books of the Republic" of 1576, the author offers one of the first modern theories of sovereignty. Written in the midst of wars of religion and the last battles of feudalism, its text will be aimed at laying the foundations of a centralized political power, whose priority is to ensure order and peace in society. Its intention is, above all, to defend a powerful monarchy, capable of immunizing the community against anarchy, but limited in the attainment of that end.

For Bodino, the power of a Republic emanates neither from God nor from society as a whole. Note that although the legitimacy of sovereign power is not yet encouraged to be based on individuals, the fact that it is based on an institution of an intermediate character, such as the family, is a clear advance in that direction. In addition to the above, Bodino also defines the members of a Republic as those who are subject to the same sovereign power. In doing so, he leaves aside the estamental vision of society and individuals and instead adopts a vision based on equal dependence on the power of the Republic. In this way, and although still in a very germinal way, Bodino approximates, although still very timidly, what will later be a properly liberal claim: equality before the law.

On the other hand, Bodinus argues that the power of the sovereign is "absolute", that is, in its theoretical construction, the sovereign power is an independent power, which governs society through laws that he himself imposes. However, this definition does not bring Bodin closer to absolutist doctrines since, in reality, his vision of sovereign power as "absolute" does not imply the inexistence of limits. In line with a certain Roman-Medieval tradition, Bodin's thesis respects the so-called Natural Law. That is to say that, although it sounds paradoxical, for Bodin, the sovereign is absolute in terms that it is neither legally nor politically limitable, but at the same time it is limited, in the sense that it must observe the natural Law. Although it is not yet the "natural rights" that limit sovereign power, as it will be in Locke, but the natural Law, the idea that there are certain limitations to power and that these are based on Nature, in some sense, places Bodino, along with other moderates and some monarchomaniacs who held similar theses, as a "proto-liberal".

3. Man: "free individual"

Liberalism is an essentially individualistic conception of society and politics. So there is no liberalism without individualism. However, the idea that man is an "individual" rather than a mere "component" of a larger organ, such as society, developed prior to liberalism. Ultimately, its origins lie in the Renaissance. However, it was the Reformation and some doctrinal elements coming from certain humanist traditions of the Middle Ages that gave individualism and the idea of man as a "free" being and bearer of certain "natural rights" a decisive and irreversible push.

On a theoretical level, the Protestant Reformation of an individualistic tendency since the Lutheran doctrine proclaims, among many other theses, the so-called "inviolability of conscience". According to her, religion should not be part of any social order commanded by a religious authority. In reality, religion, Luther will say, must be guarded in the realm of personal experience, which must be kept virgin from any transgression of public order. In a few words: for Luther, religion is an individual matter about which political power has nothing to say.

But the individualism implicit in Luther's doctrine goes beyond the idea of inviolability of conscience. As in the writings of Erasmus of Rotterdam and other humanists of the time, in his theological model there are only two extremes: the believer and God. All the other ecclesiastical links and hierarchies that had been installed by the Church are, in Luther's view, obstacles that hinder the free communication of the individual with God.

For Luther, the exercise of faith must be an activity administered by the individual himself and not by any other authority allegedly instituted by God. Simply put, in the simple God-man relationship, there are no bishops, priests, cardinals and popes to spare. By withdrawing into the intimate sphere, faith is subtracted from public life. From then on, it will be a "private" thing. In doing so, Luther lays the foundation for a fundamental distinction for liberalism: the separation between the "private" life, of which the individual is master and lord and in which no political power can interfere; and the "public" life which is the life of the individual as part of society and obliged to watch over the public good.

By denying legitimacy to ecclesiastical orders, Luther proceeds to enable one of the "leitmotif" principles of the Reformation: the free interpretation of the Bible. And there is hardly any other idea more supportive of individualism in the Protestant revolt than the free interpretation of the Texts. Indeed, to say that men have the right was to give citizenship card to individual self-determination. Thus Luther dethroned authority and instead placed the conscience of the individual. The sovereignty that Rome lost over faith was gained in equal proportion by the individual, who now, Bible in hand, can understand the Scriptures as he sees fit, according to his own and most intimate convictions. The principle of free interpretation will transcend theory and become a reality in fact with Johannes Gutenberg's invention of the printing press in 1450, which will greatly facilitate the Protestants' task of crippling the Church's interpretative monopoly on the Sacred Texts.

The individualism of the Reformation blossomed in the shadow of Christian doctrine and to it it was confined. It will be up to humanism to enlarge, radicalize and secularize it. To that individualism outlined by the Reformation will be added the notion that individuals are endowed with certain natural and innate rights that are opposable to the power of the State.

The Middle Ages ignored the individual in all its forms, in all its dimensions. When we speak of man we speak of man as a function of the social whole, not as a self-sufficient unit. Therefore, the idea that there are certain rights inherent in the person could hardly take root.

Nevertheless, especially in the Late Middle Ages, it offered some rudiments of what would later be transformed into the modern notion of "natural rights". Following closely the Stoic school, the Middle Ages will subscribe to the existence of a "natural Law", to which all men must obey equally, regardless of their creed or geographical location. Beyond its content, which varies according to the author who treats it, for the purposes of our history of liberalism it is important to emphasize that the "Natural Law" in general was wielded by the jurists of the time both against the possible excesses of the subjects and against the unbridled power of a sovereign who became a tyrant. What happens is that for the medieval imaginary, the "natural law" was the manifestation of divine reason in the world from which, like the very Scriptures, man cannot depart one iota. As we saw in some monarchomaniacs and in Bodin, who clearly prohijaron part of this theory, the "natural Law" was the limit within which the exercise of sovereign power was considered legitimate.

According to her, religion should not be part of any social order commanded by a religious authority. In reality, religion, Luther will say, must be guarded in the realm of personal experience, which must be kept virgin from any transgression of public order. In a few words: for Luther, religion is an individual matter about which political power has nothing to say.

But the individualism implicit in Luther's doctrine goes beyond the idea of inviolability of conscience. As in the writings of Erasmus of Rotterdam and other humanists of the time, in his theological model there are only two extremes: the believer and God. All the other ecclesiastical links and hierarchies that had been installed by the Church are, in Luther's view, obstacles that hinder the free communication of the individual with God.

For Luther, the exercise of faith must be an activity administered by the individual himself and not by any other authority allegedly instituted by God. Simply put, in the simple God-man relationship, there are no bishops, priests, cardinals and popes to spare. By withdrawing into the intimate sphere, faith is subtracted from public life. From then on, it will be a "private" thing. In doing so, Luther lays the foundation for a fundamental distinction for liberalism: the separation between the "private" life, of which the individual is master and lord and in which no political power can interfere; and the "public" life which is the life of the individual as part of society and obliged to watch over the public good.

By denying legitimacy to ecclesiastical orders, Luther proceeds to enable one of the "leitmotif" principles of the Reformation: the free interpretation of the Bible. And there is hardly any other idea more supportive of individualism in the Protestant revolt than the free interpretation of the Texts. Indeed, to say that men have the right was to give citizenship card to individual self-determination. Thus Luther dethroned authority and instead placed the conscience of the individual. The sovereignty that Rome lost over faith was gained in equal proportion by the individual, who now, Bible in hand, can understand the Scriptures as he sees fit, according to his own and most intimate convictions. The principle of free interpretation will transcend theory and become a reality in fact with Johannes Gutenberg's invention of the printing press in 1450, which will greatly facilitate the Protestants' task of crippling the Church's interpretative monopoly on the Sacred Texts.

The individualism of the Reformation blossomed in the shadow of Christian doctrine and to it it was confined. It will be up to humanism to enlarge, radicalize and secularize it. To that individualism outlined by the Reformation will be added the notion that individuals are endowed with certain natural and innate rights that are opposable to the power of the State.

The Middle Ages ignored the individual in all its forms, in all its dimensions. When we speak of man we speak of man as a function of the social whole, not as a self-sufficient unit. Therefore, the idea that there are certain rights inherent in the person could hardly take root.

Nevertheless, especially in the Late Middle Ages, it offered some rudiments of what would later be transformed into the modern notion of "natural rights". Following closely the Stoic school, the Middle Ages will subscribe to the existence of a "natural Law", to which all men must obey equally, regardless of their creed or geographical location. Beyond its content, which varies according to the author who treats it, for the purposes of our history of liberalism it is important to emphasize that the "Natural Law" in general was wielded by the jurists of the time both against the possible excesses of the subjects and against the unbridled power of a sovereign who became a tyrant. What happens is that for the medieval imaginary, the "natural law" was the manifestation of divine reason in the world from which, like the very Scriptures, man cannot depart one iota. As we saw in some monarchomaniacs and in Bodin, who clearly prohijaron part of this theory, the "natural Law" was the limit within which the exercise of sovereign power was considered legitimate.

It is valid to see prefigured in this stoic-medieval conception the liberal idea that political power must be limited by certain natural barriers. However, there is still a substantial difference that should not be omitted: given the organicist vision that cultivated the Middle Ages, individuals exist only as a function of their immediate subordination to the community.

According to her, religion should not be part of any social order commanded by a religious authority. In reality, religion, Luther will say, must be guarded in the realm of personal experience, which must be kept virgin from any transgression of public order. In a few words: for Luther, religion is an individual matter about which political power has nothing to say.

But the individualism implicit in Luther's doctrine goes beyond the idea of inviolability of conscience. As in the writings of Erasmus of Rotterdam and other humanists of the time, in his theological model there are only two extremes: the believer and God. All the other ecclesiastical links and hierarchies that had been installed by the Church are, in Luther's view, obstacles that hinder the free communication of the individual with God.

For Luther, the exercise of faith must be an activity administered by the individual himself and not by any other authority allegedly instituted by God. Simply put, in the simple God-man relationship, there are no bishops, priests, cardinals and popes to spare. By withdrawing into the intimate sphere, faith is subtracted from public life. From then on, it will be a "private" thing. In doing so, Luther lays the foundation for a fundamental distinction for liberalism: the separation between the "private" life, of which the individual is master and lord and in which no political power can interfere; and the "public" life which is the life of the individual as part of society and obliged to watch over the public good.

By denying legitimacy to ecclesiastical orders, Luther proceeds to enable one of the "leitmotif" principles of the Reformation: the free interpretation of the Bible. And there is hardly any other idea more supportive of individualism in the Protestant revolt than the free interpretation of the Texts. Indeed, to say that men have the right was to give citizenship card to individual self-determination. Thus Luther dethroned authority and instead placed the conscience of the individual. The sovereignty that Rome lost over faith was gained in equal proportion by the individual, who now, Bible in hand, can understand the Scriptures as he sees fit, according to his own and most intimate convictions. The principle of free interpretation will transcend theory and become a reality in fact with Johannes Gutenberg's invention of the printing press in 1450, which will greatly facilitate the Protestants' task of crippling the Church's interpretative monopoly on the Sacred Texts.

The individualism of the Reformation blossomed in the shadow of Christian doctrine and to it it was confined. It will be up to humanism to enlarge, radicalize and secularize it. To that individualism outlined by the Reformation will be added the notion that individuals are endowed with certain natural and innate rights that are opposable to the power of the State.

The Middle Ages ignored the individual in all its forms, in all its dimensions. When we speak of man we speak of man as a function of the social whole, not as a self-sufficient unit. Therefore, the idea that there are certain rights inherent in the person could hardly take root.

Nevertheless, especially in the Late Middle Ages, it offered some rudiments of what would later be transformed into the modern notion of "natural rights". Following closely the Stoic school, the Middle Ages will subscribe to the existence of a "natural Law", to which all men must obey equally, regardless of their creed or geographical location. Beyond its content, which varies according to the author who treats it, for the purposes of our history of liberalism it is important to emphasize that the "Natural Law" in general was wielded by the jurists of the time both against the possible excesses of the subjects and against the unbridled power of a sovereign who became a tyrant. What happens is that for the medieval imaginary, the "natural law" was the manifestation of divine reason in the world from which, like the very Scriptures, man cannot depart one iota. As we saw in some monarchomaniacs and in Bodin, who clearly prohijaron part of this theory, the "natural Law" was the limit within which the exercise of sovereign power was considered legitimate.

It is valid to see prefigured in this stoic-medieval conception the liberal idea that political power must be limited by certain natural barriers. However, there is still a substantial difference that should not be omitted: given the organicist vision that cultivated the Middle Ages, individuals exist only in function of their immediate subordination to the community. To the extent that the "individual", as a concept, has not yet been constructed, the "natural law" of the Middle Ages does not grant rights to individuals but does so to the entire political community. It is not, as will be later conceived, that by their mere existence individuals have a "right" to life, to property, to marriage. If life, property and marriage must be safeguarded, it is because it is so prescribed by a "natural law" of divine origin that regulates human action. In any case, the only subject "endowed" with rights were much larger entities such as the "community" or even "Humanity". But those "rights" that the "natural Law" granted could also be removed, suspended or transferred according to the circumstances. Thus, we are still far from the thesis defended by liberalism that rights are "timeless," "inherent," "inalienable," and "non-transferable.

However, this vision of "natural law" will undergo a radical turnaround. It will no longer be conceived as regulating the political community as a whole but as "equipped" each individual individually. In other words, by the 17th century, the "natural law" is "subjectivized". Although this change can already be perceived in some authors of scholastics, in reality, it will find its maximum expression only in the work of Thomas Hobbes. In his theory, rights went from being "granted" by an external and objective "natural law" to being an indissoluble and constitutive part of individual existence. In fact, for Hobbes, the first "natural law" from which all the others are derived, from now on more and more called "natural rights", is the natural tendency, observable in all men, to "self-preservation".

All men, Hobbes will say, have inscribed in their nature an inclination to preserve their own life. From this inclination, he concludes, it can be deduced that all men have an inherent "right to life". In this way, Hobbes revolutionizes what until then had been a constant in ancient and medieval political theory, going from the "Lex naturalis" to the "Jus naturale", from the "natural law" to the "natural rights". Paradoxically, Hobbes, an author who went down in history for his justification of absolutism, provided certain fundamental concepts for liberalism that will reap their first fruits a few years later with John Locke's "Two Treatises on Civil Government" (1689).

4. Towards the Construction of Tolerance

A. Wars of Religion

Thanks to the general weariness with confrontations, which were still going on after several decades of initiation, and the impetuous advance of skepticism, a new story was configured that would be fundamental to the origin of liberalism: tolerance.

As is well known, the Reformation was not a single, coherent movement. It contained within itself an enormous and unavoidable plurality. But this plurality not only benefited the secularization of politics and, later, also of Law, but also, despite the reformers, ended up favouring the progress of scepticism.

What happened was that, in its struggle against the centralization of Rome, the Reformation effectively managed to open the horizon for new interpretations but, in doing so, it also allowed the appearance of a virtual confessional and doctrinal anarchy. Indeed, anyone visiting the Europe of the time would surely see that there were as many Christian doctrines as there were possible interpretations of the Texts. Thus the problem arose as to what was the "correct" interpretation. An infinite number of theoretical battles and conceptual pujas followed one another with the aim of "demonstrating" to the adversaries the truth of their interpretation. However, this did not favour or play against any particular religious dogmatics, but against Christianity itself, since this constant intellectual conflict highlighted the obscurities, weaknesses and even contradictions which Christianity possessed and which, under the rigid hand of the Church, had not previously come to light.

On the other hand, and as a result, faith now proved insufficient to solve the problems raised among the various religious groups. Each side tried to impose its faith on the other's, which launched them directly into the war. The result of this was the bloody wars of religion that would devastate modern Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries and that would inspire the famous "bellum omnium erga omnes" of Hobbes. In them, there was the contradictory case that all sides fought passionately in the name of the same God.

Already the Catholic philosopher Jacques Bénigne Bossuet wrote that the superabundance of sects, the constant doctrinal changes and their categorical incompatibility would encourage not only skepticism but, even worse, atheism. And he was not mistaken. Skepticism was immediately evident in Francisco Sánchez's acendrado questioning of the "magister dixit", in Michel de Montaigne's "Que sais-je? and in Descartes' "methodical doubt", among others. Atheism would take longer, becoming an important social force in the eighteenth century by the hand of the Enlightenment. But what is important to emphasize here is that it is on the basis of this skepticism that is conjured up between the second half of the sixteenth century and the seventeenth century that Montaigne, Locke, Spinoza and, above all, Bayle demand more and more broad tolerance. It was rightly thought that conflicts would not end unless each side learned to live with the other and accept the irremediable differences.

B. New discoveries

This skepticism, which was born as a product of the wars of religion, was greatly enhanced from the impact caused by the new geographical discoveries "post-Colon". Indeed, the explorers who crossed the Atlantic and beyond spoke of the existence of a world that was simply unthinkable for the mentality of the time. The numerous journeys of the 16th and 17th centuries uncovered a diversity of religious beliefs, forms of political organisation and customs that not only astonished with their uniqueness but also aroused interest.

The shocking encounter with this new reality refuted the idea that it was not possible to build a virtuous society without Christianity, because it turned out that those "savages" lived peacefully and morally even though they did not know the "truth" of Christian doctrine. Worse still. The fact that the Indians lived peacefully only enhanced the evils known in a Europe that was mutilated in wars for a religion that was said to be a corollary of the best. To put it another way: while Europe was sinking into barbarism because of theological differences, the Native American, ignorant of all theology and of all intellectual contraptions and of all sophisticated hermeneutics, led a quiet, full and "in accordance with Nature" life. It was concluded that the "righteous life was, therefore, independent of all religion. Thus, this moral relativism reached out with skepticism to mount together a battle in favor of tolerance.

On the other hand, the widening of the world confronted Christianity with an endless number of other religions that came to check its, until now, undisputed title of eternal and universal religion. The testimony of the adventurers forced Christianity to be placed in the light of its context, within its geographical and historical limits. In the philosophical gatherings, still reduced to the seventeenth century, the idea soon slipped in that perhaps Christianity was but one more religion among many. If this was so, the more absurd those wars that were waged in its name seemed.

The victims on one side and the other only intensified the virulent clashes. Humanism, beloved son of the Renaissance, looked with horror at the desolate scene of death around it. He thus advocated the definitive cessation of violence and the establishment of respect for the creed of others. Philosophy became a close friend of tolerance. But it was not only philosophers who called for tolerance. They were also joined by the growing bourgeoisie, which, in the midst of incessant disputes, could not achieve its purpose of achieving the accumulation of wealth. Religious persecution was clearly detrimental to the establishment of peace, and if there is no peace, it is impossible to have a prosperous trade and a flourishing economy. It is undeniable, this new social class would say, that those countries that cultivated stability and tolerance were blessed with economic prosperity. The most outstanding case of this was the Netherlands which, despite its small size, had managed to consolidate itself as a power of international trade thanks to the peace they dominated in their lands.

The demand for tolerance grew louder as confrontations worsened and the frontiers of an expanding world increasingly questioned their meaning. The story of tolerance will be a common space in liberal and enlightened literature of the 18th century, which will feed the struggle of the Voltaire, Diderot, d'Holbach, Paine, etc.

5. Science: Advocate of Freedom and Reason

It was by no means Luther's intention to achieve the conquest of a broad freedom. As his fierce discussion with Erasmus of Rotterdam underscores, his struggle for freedom was confined to the narrow confines of the Christian religion and more specifically to the interpretation of Scripture. However, by the end of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the emerging modern science, stuck in the humanist and rationalist thrust of the Renaissance, will advocate gaining a much larger space for freedom, to which liberalism and the Enlightenment will later be added.

The fact that modern science has allied itself with freedom is not surprising. Freedom is the sine qua non of scientific activity. No scientist can have access to the truth of the world unless he is given the necessary freedom to do so. Indeed, natural reality is understood either through deduction (rationalism) or through induction (empiricism), but neither of these two modalities exonerates the scientist from having to formulate principles, theorems, hypotheses or postulates that, on more than one occasion, may come into direct collision with religious beliefs or political interests. It is impossible to achieve a rational understanding of natural phenomena if one continually fears a reprimand for the consequences of that knowledge. Scientific exercise therefore needs free speculation as well as oxygen.

Perhaps it is the now legendary conflict between Galileo and the Church that best exemplifies the urgent need for science to obtain greater freedom and to establish its own ground independent of any religious or political tutelage. In a deeper sense, this contest represented a struggle between a new cosmogony based on reason and an ancient theology that continued to cling to the old mechanism of revelation and authority. The rupture was thus inevitable. While Galileo's Copernican system was conceived by the Church as "contrary to Scripture," it was recognized that it was impossible to achieve harmonious coexistence, and thus the boundaries of both domains began to be drawn. Galileo, like many of the scientists of the time, were clear that only the division of the physical and religious kingdoms could guarantee the freedom of the former. Thus, the Italian physicist became the most important soldier of free thought.

Science progresses only as long as certain minimum requirements of freedom are guaranteed. In fact, it was not by chance that where the power of the Church was dominant, as was the case in Italy, the original cradle of the Scientific Revolution, the scientific spirit was extinguished, escaping, on the other hand, by those countries that, for various reasons, had cultivated a certain respect for freedom. Hence, the Huygens and the Newtons, like the Descartes and the Boyle, flourished or went into exile in Holland or England, countries that were pioneers at the time in the protection of the most essential freedoms.

After the Galilean revolution, the scientific spirit made its way unrestrainably and thus reaffirmed its secularizing need and self-determination. With Harvey, Torricelli, Halley, Rolfinck, etc., science proceeded to imagine the natural world on its own, using only reason, which was seen as increasingly reliable. Although censorship, persecution and even the inquisitorial shadow remained unchanged for a time, with the emergence of modern science, a cultural revolution took place that effectively saw reason as a friend of knowledge, of autonomy of thought and, in general, of freedom. With the incessant scientific discoveries of the 17th century, confidence in reason increased significantly, becoming an important source of inspiration and legitimacy for other areas of knowledge, such as politics, law and morality.

In politics in particular, the effects of the exaltation of reason would not be long in coming. It is true that the Reformation had given the initial push to the secularizing process of politics, but it is no less true that the triumph of reason over Rome's theology came to give it the final blow. What Luther had initiated in the name of a new Christianity, modern theorists will do, more or less explicitly, in the name of reason. On the other hand, all of Europe had witnessed how reason had managed to establish the limits of religious authority. In light of this, the emergence of the following analogy was inevitable: if reason has put a stop to religious authority it can also do so to political authority. In the seventeenth century, Locke, Bayle and Spinoza will be the ones who will honor this idea.

On another level, scientific rationalism also brought a sense of power to modern man as never before. Through knowledge, man was able to dominate and predict the behavior of Nature. Natural forces, once considered unfathomable, now favored the progress of society. Now, if reason and knowledge facilitated the mastery of Nature: why shouldn't they do it with society? Along this path, the idea emerges that society is, like Nature itself, an entity that can be transformed through the methodical use of reason. Society, liberal intellectuals will say, echoing the triumph of science and reason, does not replicate any supranatural order, as Saint Augustine had said. In reality, it is either another fact of Nature and, like it, moldable in the hands of reason, or a great artificial machinery, rationally assembled to satisfy the needs of individuals.

In this way, and in the wake left by the emergence of the capitalist economy, wars of religion, the progressive secularization of morality, of the Protestant Reformation, of the theoretical rudiments bequeathed by ancient and medieval thought and by the emergence of science and its rationalist correlate, liberal theory will be reaffirmed. Seeing man as a naturally "free" and "rational" "individual", and seeing society as a sophisticated techné at the service of individuals, liberalism will explicitly denounce or strive for a reconversion, be it progressive or revolutionary, of the structures of the Ancient Regime.

6. Bibliography

BONILLA, Javier. Para un análisis de los antecedentes del pensamiento liberal. Revista Prisma, N°20, 2005, Montevideo.

BREHIER, Émile. Historia de la Filosofía. Tomo II. Filosofía moderna y contemporánea. 2da ed. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.

ISRAEL, Jonathan. 2010. A Revolution of the mind. 1ra ed. United States: Princeton University Press.

LASKI, H.J. 2003. El liberalismo europeo. 1ra ed. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

OZMENT, Steven. 2005. Una Fortaleza poderosa. Historia del pueblo alemán. 1ra ed. Barcelona: Crítica.

RUSSELL, Bertrand. 2009. History of Western Philosophy. 1ra ed. London: Routledge Classics.