Truth, Subject and Philosophy in Badiou’s Ontology of the Multiple
By Jonathan Arriola
ABSTRACT
In the following
paper we explore Badiou’s ontology of the multiple. Drawing upon the major
mathematical revolutions that took place at the end of the 19th century
and the beginning of the 20th century, the French philosopher argues
that, contrarily to what the Western tradition has defended, ontology must
abandon the primacy of the One in the apprehension of being. Bent on the idea
that mathematics is ontology and that Set Theory provides a pathway to the
being of being, Badiou affirms that being is multiple and that, accordingly, it
is necessary to lay out a new ontology. This assertion leads Badiou to
reformulate the notion of truth and, along with it, to rethink the role of
philosophy in the sophistic era of feeble thinking and the death of Reason.
1. Badiou’s Ontology
“God is truly dead, as are all the categories that used to
depend on it in the order of the thinking of being.
The pass that is ours is a Platonism of the multiple.”
Badiou, Manifesto
for Philosophy
When set against the predominant tendency of
contemporary French philosophy and, more generally, of the Continental
tradition in the last decades, Badiou’s philosophy stands out because it clearly
goes against the current. Although his
thought, as we will see, is fabricated with the bricks of very old ideas,
albeit reformulated in a modern argot, his philosophy could be nonetheless
considered highly subversive when we take into consideration that it contradicts
in many ways the core of the philosophical programs developed since Heidegger’s
reappraisal of ontology and Althusserean structuralism. Three of them are of
particular relevance in the context of this paper. Firstly, Badiou reaffirms a systematic approach for philosophy amidst
the postmodern exaltation of difference, the
Other and its congenital contempt for any gesture of totalization. Secondly, he
reassesses the ontological role of mathematics
in contrast with the privileged status the latter Heidegger had yielded to the
poem in safeguarding the “ontological difference” between Being and being. And,
thirdly, Badiou redignifies the category of Truth (and truths) against the
hegemony of the so-called “feeble thinking”, which gained momentum after the
dogmatic terror of National-socialism and Stalinism, and, above all, against the
many auguries announcing the end of philosophy.
Nevertheless, Badiou’s philosophy, however explicitly
anti-postmodern in many respects, doesn’t constitute a return to a classical
modern philosophical system, aiming at totalizing reality and that thus disregards
the role of difference, the importance of the poem and the plurality of truths.
Rather, in a movement that remembers pretty much the Hegelian Aufhebung, Badiou intends to overcome post-modernity
while integrating some of their fundamental claims in a broader thought that
would re-enable philosophy to perform its task, i. g. to restore the category
of Truth and its traditional exigencies of eternity, evidence and stringency. Hence,
by means of his central concept of “event”, Badiou’s philosophy manages to make
room for the appearance difference and multiplicity, while preserving the
strong systemic vocation of his philosophy, however in a non-Hegelian and non-structuralist
manner. Likewise, by defending the existence of four conditions of philosophy
(art, politics, love and science) Badiou acknowledges the role of poem, in the
form of art, and the different truth-procedures, inherent to each condition,
that compose the world of appearance.
In order to better understand how this works in his
thought and it is necessary to deepen in his general ontology.
First of all we must say that Badiou’s ontology rejects
transcendence, offering thus a purely immanent account, which fulfills Heidegger’s
ontological maxim of avoiding falling in theology or metaphysics when inquiring
being qua being. However, one of the
most remarkable aspects of Badiou’s ontology is that it goes beyond the
positive study of being insofar as it also seeks to think, however problematic
that might be, at first glance, its negative moment. Put it simply, his
ontology is twofold: it concerns, on the one hand, Being qua being and, on the
other, Being qua not being.
Badiou introduces the negativity in his ontological
scheme by means of resorting to the mathematical figure of the “empty set”, representing
the fundamental void that is common to all sets and which Badiou sees as the
latent possibility of non-Being to manifest itself in the realm of appearances.
This leads us directly to the basic axiom of Badiou’s system: namely, that mathematics is ontology[1].
Indeed, mathematics is for Badiou that which
describes the dominion of Being qua being
and not being. But, in reality, not all of mathematics has for Badiou
ontological implications. Rather, the French philosopher only accords to set
theory such ontological status.
The reason why Badiou equates set theory with ontology
is that, in his view, set theory alone offers a pure formal doctrine of the multiple. In effect, contradicting the
Greek tradition that dominated Western thinking emphasizing the ontological unity
of being as opposed to the plurality of concrete beings, Badiou avers that
Being in itself is multiple,
inconsistent and irreducible.
As it is known, Parmenides, advancing Plato’s theory
of ideas, argued that everything that truly is, is both One and immutable, thereby negating the ontological possibility of
plurality and change and, as a result, conceiving of the reality perceived by
the senses as ultimately false. Having such monist thesis as a basis, the Greek
philosopher assured that being, insofar as it is immutable and timeless, is
only thinkable in the terms of the logical discourse. In Parmenides’ view,
being is invariably submitted to the principle of no-contradiction for it
cannot be that what is, is not or is another thing than itself. In that way, his
philosophy equates being with thinking.
Conversely, Badiou defends the meta-ontological claim,
underpinning all his system, that l’Un n’est
pas and as a result will challenge the very idea of a binary logic which
presupposes the Parmedian conception of being as one and immutable. To do such a thing, Badiou resorts to
the major revolutions in mathematics that took place in the second half of 19th
century and the beginning of the 20th.
Particularly important for Badiou’s thinking is Georg Cantor’s
discovery of the infinite multiples. The core of Cantor’s breakthrough was his
demonstration that multiples are inconsistent with one and other and thus
totally irreducible to a unique and all encompassing One. Against the
longstanding tradition in mathematics, which used to think the infinite in
terms of potentiality, Cantor shows that there are actually different levels of infinite, indicating that infinite
is not one but rather multiple. Through a series of mathematical
demonstrations, which were striking and therefore very resisted by
mathematicians at first, Cantor proves the existence of an, allow me the
wordplay, “infinite hierarchy of infinites”, composed of countless sets of
infinites, each of them infinitely larger than the other and forming accordingly
a very complex structure impossible to be articulated in a coherent whole,
given its irreducible parts.
By demonstrating that infinite does not depend on a
grand One, one overarching set, Cantor showed how important set theory was in the
readdressing of the basis of mathematics. In this manner, Cantor redeemed set
theory from the marginal place it had been assigned since Antiquity. The task
of (re)thinking mathematics from the standpoint of the multiple, that is, of set
theory, was to be performed, first, albeit unsuccessfully, by Gottlob Frege,
and a little bit latter by Zermelo and Fraenkel, who, by drawing upon Cantor’s
work, proceeded to elaborate an axiomatization of set theory and to provide by
means of it with a formal foundation of mathematics, which came to be recognized
as the most common one.
Among the axioms the Zermelo-Fraenkel theory
postulates, there is one that is of especial relevance for Badiou’s ontology of
the multiple since institute the prohibition of self-belonging in the realm of
sets: namely, the axiom of foundation (or regularity). Echoing Russell’s famous
paradox formulated in 1901 against Frege’s set theory, Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom
of foundation deems as impossible the fact that a set belongs to itself as an
element. For Badiou, that represents the formal proof of the inexistence of a
totalizing One and therefore constitutes a straightforward attack to all
thinking that departs from supposedly all inclusive and self-contained ideas,
such as God, Nation or Nature or any other form of Absolute. As Alex Ling puts
it: “pure multiplicity is for Badiou anterior to the one; inconsistency
precedes consistency.” (Barlett, A. J.; Clemens, 2010
: 49)
On the other hand, the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
contemplates an exception for the axiom of foundation and that is the
represented by the most singular set: the empty
set. This set is the only one which belongs to all sets and therefore is at
the same time part and set. Needless to say that Badiou’s draws ontological
implications from it too. Indeed, he interprets the empty set as the
possibility of a “new” occurrence to happen in all given multiple. Hence for
the French philosopher the empty set formalizes what he calls as “event”. The
“event” represents in Badiou’s program the limits of the thinkable, that which is
impossible to say and to name by ontology insofar as it exceeds the parameters
of the system into where it bursts. And we say burst because, as we have
already mentioned, the set theory has a paradoxical status with regard to all
multiples. It belongs to a determinate multiple inasmuch as it is an element of
it but, at the same time, it does not belong to it, since that the empty set
represents the possibility of the new to come in. Thereby, no multiple can ever
be a closed system because its bears with itself the possibility of a radical
rupture: the event, which the empty set represents.
At this point, it is necessary to clarify that Badiou’s
ontology works in two levels: the situation and the state of situation[2]. The former is the space of pure presentation, where there is no sense at all, being the sphere of
the “il y a”, and which constitutes an area of exploration of how the next
infinite will be. The situation is a space of transcendence within the system
of Badiou. However, it is transcendence in the immanence. Therefore, rather
than an ontological space, the situation would be a meta-ontological realm as
it provides the formal conditions from which the state of situation will
acquire its constitution -as well as the possibility to reconfigure itself by
means of the excess introduced by the event, as we will see later. In effect,
the state of situation is the level of (re)presentation of the inconsistent or
consistent multiples and, consequently, it is the place where different
possible worlds gain concrete appearance. Rather than just one ontology, what
we have at this level is fourfold ontological structure, each one with its own
logic and truth-procedures: love (the amorous encounter of two), science (the matema),
politics (political invention trough a political movement) and art (the poem or
any artistic invention).
2. The Renewal of Truth
As he explicitly states in his Manifest pour la Philosophie, Badiou wants to reassess the
philosophical importance of the notion of Truth and, with it, reassess the
value of philosophy and its sense in the 21st century. Above all,
what Badiou seeks is to redeem Truth from the numerous invectives that it has
undergone by postmodernists, which in the wake of Nietzsche’s attack on
Platonism and of the totalitarian trauma, declared the depletion of the concept
of Truth and thereby commended philosophy to death. In sharp contrast to such postmodernist’s
sentence, Badiou insists on the modern claim that Truth must be the “central
category” of philosophy. By this means, Badiou aims at rehabilitating
philosophy and combat nihilism, in the form of a radical relativism, which
beats at the very heart of the postmodern program[3]. Indeed, post-modernity can be seen as a child of the
second Wittgenstein, whose conclusion in Philosophical
Investigations, asserting that all philosophical problems are, at bottom,
problems of language, marked the course of philosophy in the sense of
relativism from the Second World War on.[4]
For Badiou, the result of this understanding of
philosophy in just linguistic terms is that it replaces truth and error for
speech and silence as the main problem of philosophy, paving the way for relativism
to dominate the scene. By enthroning difference and language in lieu of truth,
Badiou sees post-modernity as equivalent to modern sophism since it declares “…
that there are only conventions, rules, types of discourse, language games”
(119).
On the other hand, in Badiou eyes the blind
sacralization of truth, which is the opposite number of postmodern conviction,
also entails great dangers, perhaps more evil ones than those brought by
sophistic relativism. In effect, if with sophism, we have indifference to
truth, with dogmatism, we have intolerance.
Furthermore, the canonization of truth is not
whatsoever foreign to philosophy’s history. On the contrary, from the very
beginning of Western thought, countless philosophers, starting with Plato, have
systematically incurred in what Badiou calls the “disaster”, that is, they have
embraced the thoroughly misconceived idea that it is philosophy, and only it,
the kind of thinking in charge of producing truth. The French philosopher put
it as follows:
It is no longer legitimate to say, as does
the dogmatist, that there is a solo locus of Truth and that this locus is
revealed by philosophy itself. Such a retort is excessive, overstrung and
disastrous. (1999: 133)
However, Badiou argues that this deep tendency of
Western philosophy to see itself as the sole locus of truth, had its utmost
expression in the totalitarian episodes of Nazism, Imperial parliamentary
democracy and Stalinism, which claimed to be the guardian of some “sublimated
bodies”, either Race, Civilization and/or Proletariat. In Badiou’s vision, terror
is thereby the natural consequence of an inappropriate divinization of truth. In
effect, when a truth is proclaimed as being complete and holly, then the
dignity of other possible truths is immediately excluded: they are condemned as
illegitimate and moreover as contemptible. Ethics become thereby the servant of
such sacralized truth and of the sublimated body it supposedly illuminates. On
the contrary, everything that stands outside or against such enthroned truth, either
be it the Jews, the Communist,
the immigrant, the Uncivilized, etc. become the object of persecution as they
are equalized to the incarnation itself of impurity and error. By reducing the irremediably multiplicity of the names of truth to a
single, all-inclusive and eternal name[5], for instance, the idea of Good, terror arises as an
urgent necessity, as the sole possibility that could enforce the divinized form
of truth into reality itself. In that manner, disaster sets in.
In Badiou’s eyes, the origins of all substantialization
of truth, which is it at the basis of all dogmatic stance, lay in a deep
misunderstanding of being qua being.
Indeed, according to his ontology, truth is not a being and cannot ever be a being. For the French
philosopher, truth’s nature is heterogeneous and multiple[6] and it is so in a twofold sense[7]. First, because it cannot be thought apart from the
four conditions as they have each own their own truth-procedure. In that sense,
truth is immanent, thus historical,
as it is always the truth of a situation.
And second, truth’s nature is heterogeneous because, as a result of the latter,
it can always be another thing: in other words, truth is never definitive or fixed.
In effect, the event, along with the subject and the truth that arise with it,
structures a determinate state of situation but, qua void, it remains always open to the new, acquiring new forms
and making an appearance in the (phenomological) world. To negate this is to
negate the nature of truth itself. Given its close relationship with
philosophy, to reject the very possibility of an authentic philosophical
thinking. Nevertheless, the fact that truth, for Badiou, is multiple and
heterogeneous does not mean that truth is plural, as the Ancient or Modern
sophists claim. According to Badiou, multiplicity is not equal to pluralism,
for the latter implies that there are, in reality, no objective truths and
therefore that all construed truths are equally valid, while the former points
to the acknowledgment that truths arise within the four truth-procedures of
each condition.
The latter leads us to another crucial thesis of
Badiou’s ontological system, which, he argues, was already implicit in Plato’s aporetic dialogues: namely, that truth,
formally expressed, is indeed the void. For
truth is, in its pure objectivity, that which is unpresented and
unrepresentable[8]. Hence the French philosopher says that truth
produces a hole in actual knowledge. In that sense, truth and event, insofar as
the latter it is too related with the figure of the void, are intrinsically
link, specially when it comes to depict them in formal terms. And that is
precisely the point of Badiou’s argumentation when he declares that all truth
is post-événementielle, meaning that no truth is structural or axiomatic but
rather entirely dependent on a historical and contingent singularity, embodied by the event (1999: 107). Therefore, no
nomology of truth can be established since its empty essence obeys no pattern
at all: all truths “just” appear in the world. According to Badiou, no further ontological
inquiries can be made concerning what is that which causes an evental truth to
appear in the world, given that, for him, and plainly put, there are indeed no
such causes in the first place. Said otherwise, the truth of an event is, for
Badiou, causa sui, namely, the immanent
origin of its own existence: consequently, no more fundamental cause,
determining its nature, can be elucidated. Thereby, the essentially indiscernible
character of truth marks the very limits of Badiou’s immanent ontology. Needless
to say, it is identifiable at this point a clear theological moment in Badiou’s
proposal. It is a “secular theology” though, insofar as Badiou does not allow
transcendence to permeate his ontology and in that manner recognizes no God.
Rather, the theological aspect of his thought lies is in the fact that the
event and truth coming into existence is akin to revelation, into which no
rational inquiry can fully penetrate.
A. Event,
Subject and Truth
In order to illustrate the close triadic relation
between event, truth and subject that lies at the very heart of Badiou’s
ontology, the French philosopher resorts to the example of Saint Paul’s
conversion to the Christian faith, who operates by reducing the universal truth
of Christianity to the singular event of Jesus’ Resurrection. The episode is paradigmatic
inasmuch as it portraits the logic and the sequence of emergence of all evental
truth. Although truth’s appearance into the world is itself lawless and random,
for Badiou, the ontological structure regulating its development, as that of
being, is recurrent.
Indeed, regardless of their particularities, all truths
begin with a historical eruption. In
the case of Saint Paul, such eruption is incarnated by his mystical and
thoroughly unforeseeable –thence the randomness of truth- encounter with the
divinity, prompting his conversion from paganism to Christianity. In a similar
vein, Einstein’s groundbreaking relativity theory founded a new paradigm in the
realm of science by ruling out the longstanding Euclidian comprehension of
space. For their part, politics and love are not the same after, for instance,
the event of Marxist communism, who, drawing upon Hegel’s dialectic, strongly
criticized the formalism and ahistoricity of liberalism, and Freud “discovery”
of the unconscious, which challenged the Cartesian idea that
the subject is “one” and “self-transparent”.
One of the paradoxes of truth is that, despite its
singular localization and strong historical nature, it has nevertheless an
irrevocable universal vocation: furthermore, this universality is, in Badiou’s
conception, the distinctive mark of any authentic truth. By reconfiguring the
state of situation, truths have consequences that necessarily go beyond the particular
time and space in which they were born. For instance, the emergence of a truth
can lead to a reinterpretation of the past as well as it can affect the way the
future is conceived. Moreover, an evental truth might also irradiate
consequences for other state of situations: namely, it has the potential of
becoming general.
On the other hand, event and evental truth have the
particularity of giving birth to a new subjectivity. Thus, for Badiou, the
subject is neither an essence nor an individual. It is rather a process which
must be understood in relation to the irruption of the event. However, it is
the decision of this in status nascendi
subject to be loyal to the truth that the event reveals what consolidates himself
as a new form of subjectivity. In that sense, it is worth noting that the
decision founds the subject since the
subject does not exist before it. Thereby, the subjectivization process comprises
two instances. On the one hand, it encompasses the objective conditions of possibility for its arising, that is, the
opening of an event in the world. On the other, the (pre) subjective ones, pointing to the decision of the incoming-subject
to name the event and to be loyal to it. Again, this is visible in the case of
Saint Paul, who appropriates for himself the event by deciding to evangelize
once the miracle of Jesus’ Resurrection touched him. By that means, he molded a
new subject upon which the Catholic Church will be built.
B. Philosophy
and Truth
“What is proper to philosophy is not the
production of universal truths,
but rather the organization of their
synthetic reception
by forging and reformulating the category
of truth”
Badiou,
Saint Paul.
Philosophy has a very important role to play in the
context of Badiou’s ontology. As we have latter pointed out, one of Badiou’s
main goals was to rule out the sophistic relativistic stance, defending the
impossibility of accessing being qua being, which deemed philosophy’s
main task, that is, the seeking of truth, as wholly unfeasible and fruitless.
By recovering truth as a worthy category of thought, Badiou opens the paths for
philosophy to come in again into the ontological scene. However, the relation
of philosophy with truth is not the same as that which the Greek tradition and
modernity had formerly envisioned. To put it straightforwardly: for Badiou, philosophy does not
produce truths. Rather, truths are exclusively produced within the four
conditions and in accordance to their own particular truth-procedures. These
procedures enable to think the fundaments of being.
The role of philosophy in this context is to analyze the locus where truths
occur but it should keep away
of enthroning itself as the source of them. By this means, Badiou wants to
avoid the temptation of mistaking the production of truth with philosophy
itself, as dogmatists do, and therefore of falling into the “disaster”, when
philosophy transforms itself into terror and bigotry. In that sense, by
ascribing to the conditions the production of truth, Badiou conceives of them
as restrictions for philosophy insofar as it must abstain itself from
reclaiming exclusive sovereignty over the realm of truth, thus mistaking its
ontological place. But at the same time, these conditions are that which allow
philosophy to emerge.
The reason for the latter is that philosophy first and
foremost raison d’etre is to make “compossible” the truths
that appear in the conditions, offering the vantage point of allowing its
collective intelligibility. Just as philosophy must keep away from seeing
itself as the sole locus of truth, so, according to Badiou, it must avoid
suturing itself to one of its particular conditions too[9]. The suture occurs when
philosophy falls under the spell of one of its conditions and at the same time
exercises a hegemonic sway over the rest. This serious misunderstanding of
philosophy’s role in relation to its conditions has been very frequent in the
Western tradition too. As Daniel Bensaid puts it: “In the wake of the ‘Galilean event’, philosophy in the Classical age
fell under the domination of its scientific condition. In the aftermath of the
French revolution, it came under the sway of its political condition. Lastly,
with Nietzsche and Heidegger it withdrew in favor of the poem.” (2004)
The main problem with the suture is,
first, that it disregards the ontological discontinuity between the four
conditions, thus inappropriately projecting ontological categories to other
conditions, and, second, that it undermines the strong systematic nature of
philosophical inquiry. For Badiou, philosophy’s work is, above all, to compose
and make possible, hence his neologism “compossibilité”, a space where
the different generic procedures could be articulated. In other words,
philosophy must be capable of thinking conjointly the four conditions without
being reduced to any of them. Thus philosophy is wholly different from art,
politics, science and love. However, it is in philosophy that the truths of
these four non-philosophical conditions can be systematized, reconfigurated and
transformed into a philosophical Truth. Indeed,
La philosophie n’existe que
quand elle propose une compossibilité de ses conditions, la vocation
systématique est inévitable et fait partie de l’essence même de la philosophie.
(Badiou 1990 : 25)
3. Bibliography:
· BADIOU, Alain. Manifesto for Philosophy. Ed. State University of New York Press. 1999. United States.
· BADIOU, Alain. Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. Ed. Stanford University Press. 1997. United States.
· BADIOU, Alain. L’entretien de Bruxelles. Les Temps Modernes. 526. 1990.
· BARLETT, A. J.; CLEMENS. Justin. Alan Badiou. Key Concepts. Ed. Acumen. 2010. United Kingdom.
· BLAKE, Terence. In: THEORIA, La Revue. Badiou’s Reduction. Retrieved from: http://www.theoria.fr/badious-reduction-1890/
· FELD, Alina. Karl Jaspers and Alain Badiou on the Destiny of Philosophy. In: Existenz. Volume 4, No. 1, Spring 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.bu.edu/paideia/existenz/volumes/Vol.4-1Feld.html
· GÓMEZ, Guillermo. Presentación y Entrevista: Alain Badiou. 2007. Retrieved from: http://www.uia.mx/actividades/publicaciones/iberoforum/3/pdf/carlosg.pdf
· WILDEN, William. Forcing Analogies in Law: Badiou, Set Theory, and Models. In: Cardozo Law Review. 2009. University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-33. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507933
[1].- Needless to say that such a thesis is
anti-Heideggerean in essence given that for the German philosopher mathematics
has at its very basis a metaphysical interpretation of Being in terms of presence that ultimately led to the
“oblivion of Being” and thus to the rise of modern technology, reification and
inauthentic existence.
[2].- Apropos of the situation Alex Ling : “A situation
is thus any presented multiplicity whatsoever. Or again, a situation is the
constitution of inconsistent multiplicity: it is literally “the place of
taking-place” [… pure presentation prior to the structured presentation that is
the situation. (Barlett, A. J.; Clemens, 2010 : 50)
[3].- In relation to that, Badiou himself says the
following: “Sophistic and postmodern, contemporary philosophy
endorses language games, deconstruction, feeble thinking, irremediable
heterogeneity, different and differences, the ruin of reason, the fragment or
discourse in shreds, thus placing philosophy in an impasse.” (1999:135)
[4].-Of course that is not Wittgenstein alonewho opened the path to
postmodernity. Also Nietzsche’s death of God points to the same direction.
[5] The multiplicity of the names of truth—theorems,
principles, declarations, imperatives, beauty, and laws—becomes restricted to
one single eternal, genuine name, i.e.,
[6].-
With regard to that, Badiou says: “As being is multiple, and truth must be, a
truth shall be a multiple, thus a multiple-part of the situation of which it is
the truth, it cannot be an “already” given or present part. It shall stem from
a singular procedure.” (1999: 106)
[7].-
Indeed, for Badiou “Prior to philosophy, a “prior to” that is not temporal,
there are truths. These truths are heterogeneous, and proceed within the real
independently of philosophy [… These truths are related to four possible
registers, systematically explored by Plato. The four plural loci, where a few truths “insist”, are
mathematic art, the political, and the amorous encounter. Such are the factual,
historic, or pre-reflexive conditions of philosophy.” (1999: 123)
[8].- In
that sense, it is worth pointing that “el
vacío de la categoría de Verdad, con V mayúscula, no es el vacío del ser,
puesto que es un vacío operatorio, y no presentado. El único vacío que es
presentado al pensamiento es el vacío del conjunto vacío de los matemáticos. El
vacío de la Verdad . . . no es pues ontológico; es puramente lógico” (Badiou, 1992: 59).
[9].- Concerning that, Badiou says the following: “The
most frequent cause of such a blockage is that instead of constructing a space
of compossibility through which the thinking of time is practiced, philosophy
delegates its functions to one or another of its conditions, handing over the
whole of thought to one generic procedure. Philosophy is then carried out in
the element of its own suppression to that great benefit of that procedure.”
(1991 : 61)
.jpg)
Comentarios
Publicar un comentario